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A PIONEERING STATUTE IN A HOSTILE 
LANDSCAPE: BRAZIL’S ARTICLE 225 AND 
ITS SUCCESS IN PROTECTING 
BIODIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Earth is experiencing a “Sixth Great Extinction”1 and thus a drastic 
loss of biodiversity.2 The rate of species’3 extinction is currently “be-
tween 100 and 1,000 times greater” than levels predating humans.4 Bio-
diversity is an essential feature of ecosystems,5 which serve to filter wa-
ter,6 clean air,7 purify soils,8 maintain climates,9 mitigate flooding,10 and 
                                                                                                             
 1. See TERRY GLAVIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION 1 (2006). An “extinction” is “the 
termination of any lineage of organisms.” E. O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 398 (2d 
ed. 1999). Scientists distinguish this sixth extinction from the five previous mass extinc-
tions by the fact that the sixth extinction can reliably be blamed on human activity. 
GLAVIN, supra, at 3. 
 2. “Biological diversity, or biodiversity for short, is the variety of life on Earth—its 
genes, species, populations, and ecosystems.” Stuart L. Pimm et al., What is Biodiversity, 
in SUSTAINING LIFE: HOW HUMAN HEALTH DEPENDS ON BIODIVERSITY 3, 3 (Eric Chivian 
& Aaron Bernstein eds., 2008). 
 3. A “species” consists of “a population or series of populations of closely related 
and similar organisms. In sexually reproducing organisms, the species is usually more 
narrowly defined by the biological species concept: to wit, a population or series of popu-
lations of organisms that under natural conditions freely interbreed with one another but 
not with members of other species.” E. O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 217 (2002). 
 4. Pimm et al., supra note 2, at 18. The number of vertebrate species fell by 31% 
between 1970 and 2006. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global 
Diversity Outlook 3, at 24 (2010) [hereinafter Global Diversity Outlook 3], available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/gbo/gbo3-final-en.pdf. Vertebrates are species con-
taining a back bone protecting a central nerve cord. They include mammals, birds, fish, 
amphibians, and reptiles. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE, supra note 1, at 407. Scien-
tists estimate that 25% of all plant species, 42% of all amphibian species, and 40% of all 
bird species are approaching extinction. Global Diversity Outlook 3, supra, at 24. 
 5. An ecosystem is “a collection of different species, the physical environment in 
which they live, and the sum total of their interactions.” Pimm et al., supra note 2, at 4. 
 6. For example, microscopic organisms (microbes) transform nitrogen from its pol-
lutant form into a harmless gas. Plants and microbes act to remove other toxic chemicals 
from rain runoff. Id. at 84. 
 7. Tree leaves capture particulates derived from fossil fuel combustion, fires, and 
other sources. Id. at 82. 
 8. Many plants capture heavy metals derived from industrial waste because the 
plants are able to use the heavy metals as a defense against insects and microbes. Id. at 
92–95. 
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prevent erosion.11 Studies indicate that ecosystems perform $33 trillion 
worth of the above services per year,12 and thus they are an enormously 
valuable asset, considering that the world’s 2010 world gross domestic 
product totaled $63.17 trillion.13 
Since the 1980s, human society has become increasingly aware of the 
threat its activities pose to biodiversity as well as the extent to which 
human society relies on biodiversity.14 One hundred thirty nations have 
integrated explicit environmental provisions into their national constitu-
tions.15 Some observers claim that Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution 
(the “1988 Constitution”) is the world’s most advanced statute protecting 
the environment.16 The centerpiece of the 1988 Constitution’s environ-
mental program is Article 225,17 which includes both a fundamental right 
                                                                                                             
 9. In soils and plants, terrestrial ecosystems store 2,100 billion metric tons of car-
bon. This represents a valuable contribution to mitigating Earth’s warming. See id. at 98. 
 10. From the near extermination of beavers at the height of the fur trade to the drain-
ing of flood plains, scientists believe human actions that harm biodiversity have exacer-
bated flood damages over the last three hundred years. See id. at 87–89. 
 11. Plant roots act to anchor soil, forest canopies reduce the velocity of rain, and tun-
nels formed by roots and animals channel runoff instead of allowing it to gather destruc-
tive force above ground. Id. at 89. 
 12. Robert Costanza et. al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, NATURE, May 1997, at 253. 
 13. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Oct. 18, 2011), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html#. 
 14. See generally BIODIVERSITY II: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR 
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla, Don E. Wilson & Edward O. Wilson 
eds., 2d ed. 1997) (following up on the seminal Biodiversity published in 1988, this up-
date explores the range of biodiversity, its importance, methods of studying it, and how 
humans affect it); Pimm et al., supra note 2 (discussing the complex and indivisible rela-
tionship between biodiversity and human well-being); WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE, 
supra note 3 (describing the ongoing decline of biodiversity and policies required to re-
verse this trend). 
 15. James R. May, Constituting Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 113, 114 (2005–2006). Sixty such constitutions provide a “fundamental right to a 
‘clean,’ ‘healthful,’ or ‘favorable’ environment.” Id. at 114. 
 16. See Henry McGee Jr. & Kurt Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the Brazilian 
Amazon: Law, Politics, and International Cooperation, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
513, 531 (1989–1990); see also Joshua Bruckerhoff, Giving Nature Constitutional Pro-
tection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
615, 635 (2007) (suggesting that the Brazilian Constitution is an “ideal model for how 
constitutional language can provide a link between environmental rights and biodiversity 
protection”). 
 17. Constituição Federal [C.F.] [CONSTUTITUION] art. 225 (Braz.). This article reads 
in relevant part: 
CHAPTER VI—ENVIRONMENT 
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Article 225. All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment which is an asset 
of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and both the Government and 
the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future gener-
ations. 
 
Paragraph 1 - In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is incumbent upon the 
Government to: 
 
I - preserve and restore the essential ecological processes and provide for the 
ecological treatment of species and ecosystems; 
 
II - preserve the diversity and integrity of the genetic patrimony of the country 
and to control entities engaged in research and manipulation of genetic mate-
rial; 
 
III - define, in all units of the Federation, territorial spaces and their compo-
nents which are to receive special protection. any alterations and suppressions 
being allowed only by means of law, and any use which may harm the integri-
ty of the attributes which justify their protection being forbidden; 
 
IV - require, in the manner prescribed by law, for the installation of works and 
activities which may potentially cause significant degradation of the environ-
ment, a prior environmental impact study, which shall be made public; 
 
V - control the production, sale and use of techniques, methods or substances 
which represent a risk to life, the quality of life and the environment; 
 
VI - promote environment education in all school levels and public awareness 
of the need to preserve the environment; 
 
VII - protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in the manner pre-
scribed by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological func-
tion, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty. 
 
Paragraph 2 - Those who exploit mineral resources shall be required to restore the de-
graded environment, in accordance with the technical solutions demanded by the compe-
tent public agency, as provided by law. 
 
Paragraph 3 - Procedures and activities considered as harmful to the environment shall 
subject the infractors, be they individuals or legal entities, to penal and administrative 
sanctions, without prejudice to the obligation to repair the damages caused. 
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to a biologically diverse environment and a statement of national policy 
aimed at protecting biodiversity.18 For the past twenty years, however, 
legal scholars have refused to attribute improved biodiversity protections 
to Article 225 because they allege that Brazil’s enforcement mechanisms 
remain incapable of implementing Article 225.19 
This Note reveals that Article 225, despite enforcement difficulties, has 
been instrumental in protecting biodiversity through legislation, litiga-
tion, and as a statement of principle.20 Part I will describe biodiversity in 
Brazil and its decline. Part II will set forth the weaknesses in Brazil’s 
biodiversity law before Article 225. Part III will describe the circum-
stances surrounding Article 225’s adoption and the implications of its 
language. Part IV will summarize enforcement obstacles confronting Ar-
                                                                                                             
Paragraph 4 - The Brazilian Amazonian Forest, the Atlantic Forest, the Serra do Mar, the 
Pantanal Mato-Grossense and the coastal zone are part of the national patrimony, and 
they shall be used, as provided by law, under conditions which ensure the preservation of 
the environment, therein included the use of mineral resources. 
 
Paragraph 5 - The unoccupied lands or lands seized by the states through discriminatory 
actions which are necessary to protect the natural ecosystems are inalienable. 
 
Paragraph 6 - Power plants operated by nuclear reactor shall have their location defined 
in federal law and may not otherwise be installed. 
 18. See id. (“All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment . . . and both 
the Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for 
present and future generations.”). 
 19. See generally Janelle E. Kellman, The Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environ-
mental Protection: Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 146 (2000–
2001) (arguing that Brazil’s judicial and legal culture is not conducive to actualizing 
environmental law); Christina Schwansee Romano, Brazilian Government Policies to-
wards the Amazon Rain Forest: From a Developmental Ideology to an Environmental 
Consciousness, 10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (1999) (asserting that a lack 
of human and financial resources renders Brazilian environmental policy “largely rhetori-
cal”; describing problems undermining the Brazilian judiciary, including corruption, lack 
of judges, large caseloads, nepotism, and “politicization,” and attributing the failure of 
implementing national constitutional rights in Brazil to the “administrative culture” and 
“political-economic atmosphere” characteristic of a postcolonial society); Augusto Zim-
mermann, Constitutional Rights in Brazil: A Legal Fiction, 14 ELAW J. 28, 55 (2007) 
(attributing the unenforceability of constitutional rights to the “sense of lawlessness that 
pervades Brazilian society as a whole”); James May & Erin Daly, Vindicating Funda-
mental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 365, 406 (2009) (conclud-
ing as recently as 2009 that Article 225’s fundamental right is “unenforceable” due to the 
continuing pressures of economic development). 
 20. This Note analyzes English language scholarship regarding Article 225. See C.F. 
art. 225 (Braz.). 
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ticle 225 and describe how Article 225 has nevertheless improved biodi-
versity protections in Brazil through strengthening biodiversity legisla-
tion, influencing environmental litigation, and presenting a constitutional 
statement of principle. 
I. THE DECLINE OF BIODIVERSITY IN BRAZIL 
Brazil contains about 10% of the world’s known plant and animal spe-
cies, and probably contains an even larger percentage of the world’s ex-
isting species.21 Because Brazil possesses one-third of the remaining 
rainforest on Earth,22 it has become a front line in the struggle to protect 
biodiversity.23 The Amazon rainforest is “home to Earth’s greatest diver-
sity of birds, insects and plants.”24 New species continue to be discovered 
in the Amazon rainforest at a remarkable rate.25 Despite the Amazon’s 
                                                                                                             
 21. About Brazil, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND [WWF], 
http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/brazil/about_brazil/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2012) [hereinafter WWF–BRAZIL]. Scientific research has been the least thorough in the 
world’s most biologically diverse regions, such as tropical rainforests. Thomas M. Lew-
insohn & Paulo Inácio Prado, How Many Species are there in Brazil?, 19 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 619, 621. Other studies have claimed that the Amazon rainforest itself contains 
20% of the world’s existing biodiversity. Colin Crawford & Guilherme Pignataro, The 
Insistent (and Unrelenting) Challenges of Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding 
“Law that Sticks,” 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008). For up-to-date data on 
Brazil’s biodiversity, see MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT TO 
THE CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY: BRAZIL (2010) [hereinafter MINISTRY REPORT], 
available at www.cbd.int/doc/world/br/br-nr-04-en.pdf. 
 22. WWF–BRAZIL, supra note 21. 
 23. E.O. Wilson has said: “The greatest ongoing damage was and remains the de-
struction of tropical forests, where most kinds of plants and animals on Earth live. It has 
always been clear that the struggle to save biological diversity will be won or lost in the 
forests.” WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 171. But see Douglas Southgate 
& Howard L. Clark, Can Conservation Projects Save Biodiversity in South America, 
AMBIO, May 1993, at 163 (cautioning against an approach to conservation that focuses 
too much on the Amazon rainforest at the expense of other Brazilian and South American 
ecosystems). 
 24. LAURA & WILLIAM RILEY, NATURE’S STRONGHOLDS: THE WORLD’S GREAT 
WILDLIFE RESERVES 529 (2005). Of the Amazon’s plant species, 75% are endemic to the 
area. An “endemic species” is a species found in a certain region and nowhere else. 
CHRISTIAN THOMPSON, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, AMAZON ALIVE!: A DECADE OF 
DISCOVERY 1999–2009, at 7 n.1 (2009). The Amazon contains nearly 25% of the world’s 
known bird species and 50% of known freshwater fish species. RILEY, supra, at 529. 
 25. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 8–11 (noting that at least 1,222 new 
species of plants and vertebrates were discovered between 1999 and 2009, including a 
new species of anaconda, tarantula, and parrot). However, the report reminds us that its 
statistics do not include invertebrates and thus calculations of the Amazon’s biodiversity 
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wealth of biodiversity, scientists believe the “greatest plant diversity on 
the planet” exists in Brazil’s Atlantic Rainforest.26 The Pantanal, another 
biome located on the southwestern border of Brazil, is considered the 
“world’s largest wetland”27 and “home to some of the greatest concentra-
tions of fauna in the New World.”28 Other noteworthy biomes include the 
Cerrado,29 Araucarias,30 Caatinga,31 and various “coastal ecosystems” 
along Brazil’s Atlantic coast.32 
Numerous anthropocentric activities jeopardize the existence of these 
biologically diverse biomes. The five principle causes of worldwide bio-
diversity decline are habitat loss, unsustainable exploitation of natural 
                                                                                                             
are certainly underestimated. See id. For example, “in approximately 5 hectares of Ama-
zon rainforest, 365 species of ants [invertebrates] were found.” Id. at 7. 
 26. Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 10. 
 27. “Generally, wetlands are lands where saturation with water is the dominant factor 
determining the nature of soil development and the types of plant and animal communi-
ties living in the soil and on its surface.” Wetlands Definitions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/definitions.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2012). 
 28. RILEY, supra note 24, at 533. The biodiversity of the Pantanal includes the capy-
bara, “the world’s largest rodent,” and so many varieties of birds that “birders often see 
100 or more avian species in a single day.” Id. at 534. 
 29. “A conjunction of vegetable formations, at times dominated by herbaceous plants 
and at others by bushes and small trees” which accounts for 25% of Brazil’s land. Craw-
ford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 11. It contains 4,400 endemic plant species, 14 en-
demic mammal species, 17 endemic bird species, 28 endemic amphibian species, 33 en-
demic reptile species, and 200 endemic freshwater-fish species. Biodiversity Hotspots: 
Cerrado, CONSERVATION INT’L, 
http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/hotspots/cerrado/Pages/biodiversity.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2012). The Cerrado includes an underground river system which some 
scientists have suggested may contain biodiversity equal to the Amazon Rainforest. 
Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 11. 
 30. A forest comprising 15% of Brazil’s territory and distinguished by the pine spe-
cies Araucaria angustifolia. Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 11. 
 31. A “desert-like” biome comprising 11% of Brazil’s territory. Id. at 311. In the 
Caatinga, 30% of the plant species and 10% of the vertebrate animals are endemic. Jose 
Maria C. da Silva, Terrestrial Ecoregions: Caatinga, WWF (2001), 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/nt/nt1304_full.html. 
 32. Brazil’s coastal ecosystems include mangrove swamps and other habitats that 
possess variations of Amazon species specially adapted to live in sandy salt water. Craw-
ford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 12–13. 
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resources, invasive species,33 pollution, and climate change.34 The largest 
single source of biodiversity loss in the world is habitat loss.35 
In Brazil, studies have focused on deforestation as the primary cause of 
habitat loss.36 Highway construction,37 soybean cultivation,38 logging,39 
cattle pasture,40 mining,41 human-induced flooding,42 assertion of land 
title,43 and systematic government efforts to settle sparsely populated 
                                                                                                             
 33. An invasive species is “[a] species of plant, animal, or microorganism that is both 
alien to the environment in which it lives and destructive in some manner to the environ-
ment and its inhabitants.” WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 216. 
 34. Global Diversity Outlook 3, supra note 4, at 55. 
 35. Id.; see also Southgate & Clark, supra note 23, at 163 (“Almost everyone agrees, 
reasonably enough, that habitat loss is the main cause of species extinction in most parts 
of the world.”). 
 36. The causes of deforestation in Brazil have been amply documented. See generally 
Emilio Moran, Deforestation and Land Use in the Brazilian Amazon, 21 HUM. ECOLOGY 
1, 3–8 (1993) [hereinafter Moran, Deforestation and Land Use] (tracing the deforestation 
of the Amazon from the founding of Brasilia in the late-1950s and construction of sur-
rounding roads to present-day cattle farming, soy agriculture, land speculation, govern-
ment development subsidies, mining, and logging); Romano, supra note 19 (focusing on 
the Brazilian government’s “ideology” of “developmentalism” during the 1960s, 1970s, 
and the 1980s, which produced fiscal incentives and tax policies provoking deforesta-
tion); U.N. Envtl. Programme [UNEP], State of Biodiversity in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP], available at 
http://www.unep.org/dec/PDF/LatinAmerica_StateofBiodiv.pdf (attributing half of all 
deforestation in Latin America to commercial agriculture but also naming logging and 
infrastructure as secondary causes). 
 37. Moran, Deforestation and Land Use, supra note 36, at 3–8. 
 38. Brazil produces the second-largest amount of soy among the world’s nations. 
Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 316. 
 39. Logging has been a minimal cause of deforestation compared to other factors. 
Only about 4% of deforestation through the 1970s was due to lumbering. Michael S. 
Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative –Global Ecological Dis-
aster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537, 550 (1988). 
 40. Logging and soybean cultivation, though significant factors, “pale. . . in compari-
son to the spectacular rise in cattle ranching.” Bradley S. Romig, Agriculture in Brazil 
and its Effect on Deforestation and the Landless Movement: A Government’s Attempt to 
Balance Agricultural Success and Social Collateral Damage, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 
87 (2006). 
 41. Moran, Deforestation and Land Use, supra note 36, at 7. 
 42. For example, three hydroelectric dams flooded 2,000 km2 of the Amazon rainfor-
est in the 1980s. James Brooke, Tucurui Journal; In an Amazon Lake, Underwater Log-
ging Blooms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at A4. 
 43. Numerous government programs have required landowners to “improve” the land 
(which often involves clearing forest) in order to assert title. Giaimo, supra note 39, at 
548. 
720 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
regions all propel deforestation.44 Deforestation has certainly resulted in 
the extinction of numerous species in Brazil.45 It also tends to exacerbate 
the other causes of biodiversity decline.46 
Deforestation and other forms of habitat loss have significantly harmed 
Brazil’s most biologically diverse biomes. The Atlantic Rainforest is 
considered the “second most endangered ecosystem in the world.”47 
Though it once covered 15% of Brazil, now only 7.3% of the entire for-
est remains.48 After the Atlantic Rainforest, human activity has harmed 
the Cerrado more than all other Brazilian habitats.49 Grain and beef agri-
culture, as well as charcoal production, have resulted in the steady deple-
tion of the Cerrado’s natural resources.50 
In the Amazon, there was no significant deforestation before 1975.51 
By 1988, compelled by government-sponsored development and eco-
nomic expansion, Brazil was burning more rainforest than any other 
country in the world.52 Yet deforestation did not peak in Brazil until 
2004.53 A general consensus posits that 17% of the original forest has 
been destroyed due to human activity.54 
                                                                                                             
 44. Before increased environmental consciousness at the end of the 1980s, govern-
ment subsidies and incentives allowed “a relatively small population to have a large and 
deleterious impact on the rain forest.” Romano, supra note 19, at 66. 
 45. I.M. Turner, Species Loss in Fragments of Tropical Rain Forest: A Review of the 
Evidence, 33 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 200, 200 (1999). 
 46. Jeannine Maria Felfili, Growth, Recruitment, and Mortality in the Gama Gallery 
Forest in Brazil over a Six Year Period (1985-1991), J. TROPICAL ECOLOGY 67, 68 (1995) 
(describing how deforestation and ensuing mining and farming causes mercury poisoning 
and other kinds of pollution in nearby water courses thus destroying freshwater habitats); 
About the Amazon, WWF, 
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/amazon/about_the_amazon (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2012) (describing how the Amazon rainforest contains between 90–140 
billion metric tons of carbon which “would accelerate global warming significantly” if 
released). 
 47. Second only to Madagascar’s rainforest. Marcia Marques  et. al., Water Environ-
ments Anthropogenic Pressures and Ecosystem Changes in the Atlantic Drainage Basins 
of Brazil, 33 AMBIO 68, 71–72 (2004). 
 48. Id. at 72. 
 49. MINISTRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 68. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Moran, Deforestation and Land Use, supra note 36, at 8. 
 52. Kellman, supra note 19, at 147–48. 
 53. 27,000 km2 were burned during 2004. Deforestation in the Amazon declined dra-
matically between 2008 and 2009 (7,000 km2 of forest was cleared.) UNEP, supra note 
36, at 2. In 2010, the Brazilian government announced the largest reduction in deforesta-
tion since the government had begun tracking nationwide deforestation in 1988 (the year 
Article 225 was ratified as part of the 1988 Constitution). Brazil Details Record Drop in 
Deforestation, 33 INT’L. ENVTL. REP. (BNA) No. 473, at 886 (May 2010). Greenpeace, 
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Though habitat loss is the preeminent threat to biodiversity in Brazil, 
the other causes of biodiversity decline are not without representation 
across the Brazilian ecological landscape. A 2005 study identified 171 
invasive species55 competing with native flora and fauna.56 Pollution in 
Brazil’s waterways remains a prominent menace to biodiversity.57 Un-
sustainable resource exploitation, though typically associated with defor-
estation, is viewed as the primary threat to Brazil’s marine habitats.58 
Agricultural and industrial wastes represent ongoing challenges to eco-
logical health.59 Climate change predictive models suggest upcoming 
biome transformation throughout Brazil.60 Within these biomes, scien-
tists expect the total number of endangered species to rise to 744 by 
2020.61 
                                                                                                             
however, has indicated that the reduction is due to the worldwide economic crises as 
opposed to environmental regulation. Id. Another cause for concern is the massive in-
crease in deforestation announced in May 2011. Brazil: Amazon Rainforest Deforestation 
rises Sharply, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
latin-america-13449792. This latest study concluded that deforestation had risen by 27% 
between August 2010 and April 2011. Id. Many observers attribute the sudden upswing 
in deforestation to a pending bill in the Brazilian legislature which would forgive viola-
tions of the Forest Code, a law dating from 1934 which limits the amount of land farmers 
can deforest. Id. Yet Stephan Schwartzman of the Environmental Defense Fund believes 
that agriculturalists are seeking to weaken the Forest Code because the former environ-
ment minister, Marina Silva, began to rigorously enforce it over the past decade. In Bra-
zil, Fears of a Slide Back for Amazon Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at A6. If 
such views are correct, they indicate that Brazil’s enforcement mechanisms are finally 
overtaking Article 225’s ambitious environmental framework. 
 54. UNEP, supra note 36, at 2. 
 55. MINISTRY REPORT, supra note 21, at 54. 
 56. Humans intentionally introduced 76% of the invasive species. Id. at 54. 
 57. Just 52.2% of Brazilian municipalities currently have a wastewater collection 
system. Only 18% of wastewater receives treatment and 58% of collected solid waste 
does not receive proper disposal. Id. at 72–75. 
 58. Fishing and related activities are causing substantial damage to marine habitats. 
Id. at 84. 
 59. Brazil imports more agricultural chemicals than any other country. Id. at 73–77. 
 60. Winter temperatures could increase in the Amazon while rainfall decreases. See 
id. at 81. Pessimistic scenarios suggest the Amazon and Atlantic Forests could become 
grassland. See id. Temperatures are expected to rise in the Pantanal. Id. On the coasts, 
coral reefs could become the first Brazilian ecosystems to become irretrievably destroyed 
as a result of climate change. Id. 
 61. Id. at 37. 
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II. WEAKNESSES IN BRAZIL’S BIODIVERSITY LAW BEFORE ARTICLE 225 
Before Article 225, Brazilian biodiversity protections were embedded 
in policy aimed at human health and economic development.62 Not until 
the 1980s did Brazil’s national policy diverge from a rampant pro-
development agenda.63 The federal legislature passed various codes to 
protect water and forests,64 yet the government’s unbridled pursuit of 
economic development led to only minimal conservation of resources.65 
Prior to Article 225, even Brazil’s most broad and vigorous “environ-
mental” legislation relegated biodiversity to a subservient role beneath 
economic expansion. 
For example, observers characterize the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1981 (“NEP”) as “Brazil’s cornerstone environmental regula-
tion.”66 The law instituted a short-lived but wide mandate for the gov-
ernment to pursue sustainable development, set environmental standards, 
research the environment, and educate the Brazilian populace regarding 
the environment.67 NEP created the National Environmental System 
                                                                                                             
 62. The term “ecological” appeared in a constitutional amendment from 1969 but it 
referred only to a precondition for landowners to receive government subsidies. Antonio 
De Aguiar Patriota, An Introduction to Brazilian Environmental Law, 40 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 611, 613 (2009). “Ecology” is “[t]he scientific study of the interaction of 
organisms with their environment, including the physical environment and the other or-
ganisms in it.” WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 214. It is worthwhile to 
note the scarcity of this term in legislation before 1988 because Article 225 describes a 
fundamental right to an “ecologically balanced” environment. Ernest Brandl & Hartwin 
Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative 
Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 78 (1992). 
 63. See José Drummond & Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Brazilian Environmental Laws 
and Policies 1934-2002: A Critical Overview, 28 LAW & POL’Y 83, 85 (2006) (dividing 
Brazilian environmental law into three distinct phases between 1932 and 2002: 1934–
1964, “marked by strong development efforts based on pervasive state intervention ...and 
on the expansion of agricultural frontiers”; 1964–1988, a period similar to the first except 
for the presence of “renewed environmental regulations and policies”; and 1989–2002, a 
period marked by comprehensive reform of environmental regulations, consolidation of 
environmental agencies and laws, but a lack of effective state intervention). For a general 
history of Brazilian environmentalism reaching as far back as the Roman invasion of 
Lusitania (modern day Portugal, the colonizer of Brazil), see Arlindo Daibert, Historical 
Views on Environment And Environmental Law in Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
779 (2008–2009). 
 64. See Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 86–89. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 93. NEP was the very first time the term “environment” had been defined in 
Brazilian laws. Patriota, supra note 62, at 612. 
 67. Kellman, supra note 19, at 154. 
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(“SISNAMA”)68 and its sub-council, the National Environmental Coun-
cil (“CONAMA”)69 to implement Brazil’s environmental goals.70 NEP 
sought to achieve the “preservation, enhancement and restoration of en-
vironmental quality essential to life, aiming at insuring socio-economic 
development conditions.”71 Therefore biodiversity protection was not a 
goal in and of itself. The reality of such an arrangement meant that the 
law prioritized national security and economic development, but failed to 
elevate biodiversity conservation beyond a “clear third place.”72 The law 
emphasized “optimum economic conditions” and thus represented a con-
tinuum of subjugating biodiversity’s needs to overriding economic con-
cerns.73 NEP was just a “trace” of a legal initiative to remove threats to 
biodiversity.74 The law proved that the Brazilian government still regard-
ed economic development as the priority in enacting federal environmen-
tal legislation. Brazil still lacked a legal declaration of sufficient authori-
ty and sanctity that could lift biodiversity into the category of a legisla-
tive objective. 
Other legislative acts less revered than NEP also represented mere 
traces of biodiversity as a priority. Decree-Law 5.894, passed in 1943, 
established the government’s option to create special refuges for native 
animals.75 Though breeding and domestication may not have been the 
law’s goals, the absence of these concerns does not mean that the legisla-
ture passed the act for the ultimate purpose of protecting biodiversity. In 
fact, Decree-Law 5.894 served to expound upon the 1934 Hunting and 
Fishing Code.76 
                                                                                                             
 68. SISNAMA is an umbrella network of environmental agencies and their regula-
tions drawn from the local, state, and federal level. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra 
note 63, at 93. 
 69. CONAMA is SISNAMA’s operative branch, charged with establishing guidelines 
and regulations for the issuance of pollution permits, screening environmental impact 
statements, undertaking technological development, managing tax breaks to relevant 
industries, and setting penalty levels for environmental violations. Id. CONAMA in-
cludes employees of federal, state, and local government and representatives of business-
es, scientific institutions, environmental NGOs, and labor unions. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
22.9.2010 (Braz.) 
 72. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 92. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Drummond and Barros-Platiau claim that there are no “signs” that “commercial 
breeding” or “domestication” were goals of this decree and at the time such a concern for 
“breeding of wild animals . . . was rare anywhere in the world.” Id. at 88. 
 76. See id. 
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Furthermore, where Brazil made modest advances towards protecting 
biodiversity as a consequence of economic policies, the progress was 
soon reversed. For instance, the Land Statute, passed in 1964, allowed 
the government to confiscate private land if the land’s title-holder failed 
to preserve the land’s “social function.”77 The achievement of social 
function required “conservation of natural resources,” as well as fair dis-
tribution and “adequate use.”78 Yet “nature” remained classified as a “re-
source” and buried within the larger contemporary issue of property 
rights.79 The law did not mention biodiversity as a policy goal, and in-
stead was aimed directly at land reform.80 
In 1969, Decree-Law 554 essentially removed the government’s power 
to confiscate land based on the owner’s “waste” of resources,81 therefore 
reversing a key tenet of the Land Statute.82 The new law did permit the 
government to buy private properties in order to create national parks,83 
but no national parks were created as a result of the Land Statute or the 
less progressive Decree-Law 554.84 As a result, the two laws neither ad-
vanced biodiversity nor defined biodiversity as a legitimate legislative 
goal.85 
Similarly, Decree-Law 289 of 1967 failed to prioritize biodiversity 
protection despite creating a federal agency “dedicated to the issue of 
conservation and preservation of renewable natural resources in Bra-
zil.”86 The new agency, the Brazilian Institute of Forestry Development 
(“IBDF”), was mostly concerned with the limited issue of logging man-
agement.87 In fact, Decree-Law 289 may have actually reduced biodiver-
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 89. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. Colin Crawford and Guilherme Pignataro caution that Brazilian law tradi-
tionally guards individuals’ property rights with greater sanctity than in the United States. 
Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 20. Although the 1934 Constitution explicitly 
recognized the social function of property, the private property tradition exacerbated by 
Brazil’s rampant development blunted the teeth of Brazil’s early environmental laws. Id. 
at 20–21. Drummond and Barros-Platiau assert that “the most important institutional 
trend to affect contemporary Brazilian environmental regulations is the chronic lack of 
governmental control over public lands and private land uses.” Drummond & Barros-
Platiau, supra note 63, at 85. 
 80. See Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 89. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. For a complete introduction to Brazil’s numerous kinds of conservation units, see 
generally Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21. 
 84. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 89. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 91. 
 87. Id. 
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sity protection since it placed parks and nature reserves under the control 
of a “production-oriented agency.”88 
Other early environmental laws and concepts aimed at biodiversity 
protection were discredited because of the political climate during which 
they emerged.89 The New Forest Code of 1965 broadened the definition 
of “protective” forests and distinguished actual plant species that merited 
protection in certain ecosystems.90 The code provided tax incentives to 
private owners of protected forests in return for conservation ease-
ments.91 Article 3 of the code listed the reasons behind the legislation: 
“preservation of scenic beauty, conservation of soils, stabilization of 
dunes, protection of soils, preservation of habitats, [and] protection of 
indigenous peoples.”92 Though the New Forest Code may have signaled 
“significant conceptual innovations,”93 it also represented the undemo-
cratic coercion projected by a military dictatorship.94 Those parties nega-
                                                                                                             
 88. However, in the 1970s, the IBDF established eleven national parks and nine bio-
logical preserves. Id. “These include some of the most important and/or largest compo-
nents of the Brazilian conservation unit system.” Id. 
 89. For example, “the phrase social function first appeared in Brazilian law in the 
constitution of 1946 but was largely ignored by the government until the end of military 
rule in Brazil in 1985.” Thomas T. Ankersen & Ruppert Thomas, Tierra y Libertad: The 
Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 
102 (2006). Therefore, not only was biodiversity protection subsumed under the social 
function of property, but oftentimes the explicit concern for social function was not seri-
ously addressed by military dictatorships. 
 90. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 90. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. The year before the government passed the New Forest Code, a coup d’etat un-
seated the federal democracy which had existed since 1945. Keith Rosenn, Federalism in 
Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 580–81 (2004–2005). In the new military dictatorship, the 
government restricted the franchise for presidential elections to military generals, con-
fined the appointment of state governors to the preferences of the military, and “purged” 
the Congress of “subversive elements.” Id. at 583. The dictatorship curbed civil and polit-
ical rights, censored the press through intimidation and imprisonment, ostracized scholars 
espousing doctrines contrary to the government’s program, maximized the authority of 
military tribunals to hear political crimes, and permitted law enforcement to employ tor-
ture against “threats” to “national security.” Henry J. Steiner & Henry J. Trubek, Brazil – 
All Power to the Generals, 49 FOREIGN AFF. 464, 464–79 (1971) (describing the ideolog-
ical, political, and economic causes of the 1964 coup d’etat and its impact on Brazil). 
Though some hallmarks of the military dictatorship were relaxed in the 1970s as the dic-
tatorship’s once-successful economic program stagnated and opposition grew, the mili-
tary did not allow a transition to democracy until 1985. Rosenn, supra, at 583. The New 
Forest Code and the Animal Protection Law both updated codes created during a military 
dictatorship pre-dating the 1964 coup. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 
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tively affected by the New Forest Code had no “defense” against gov-
ernment action.95 The authoritarian context and rigidity of the decree be-
came increasingly unappealing as a more democratic approach to the 
environment ripened throughout Brazil in the 1980s.96 Additionally, the 
absence of a national policy protecting biodiversity remained a consider-
able defect of the New Forest Code, which did not yet carry constitution-
al force.97 
Political context also cast doubt upon Law-Decree 73.030 of 1973. 
This law-decree created the Special Secretariat for the Environment 
(“SEMA”), Brazil’s first agency dedicated to preserving the environment 
without the often conflicting duty to develop natural resources.98 Schol-
ars have suggested that Law-Decree 73.030 was merely a way for Brazil 
to deflect international hostility it had provoked at the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference.99 The military dictatorship’s national environmental pro-
grams were largely confined to “rhetoric” as opposed to practical solu-
tions.100 
                                                                                                             
87–88, 89, 90. This earlier dictatorship, the Vargas dictatorship (1938–1945), was charac-
terized by the repression of legislatures at both the federal and state level, destruction of 
state autonomy, and a unitary, centralized nation. Rosenn, supra, at 583. Vargas censored 
the press, abolished all political parties, unleashed police against political dissidents, 
curbed women’s rights, and appeased labor with “paternalist social legislation” and 
“populist rhetoric.” Benjamin Keen & Keith Haynes, Brazil: Populism and Struggle for 
Democracy in a Multiracial Society, in A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA: INDEPENDENCE TO 
THE PRESENT 339, 345 (8th ed. 2009). 
 95. See Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 25. 
 96. See infra pp. 730–33. 
 97. See Crawford, supra note 21, at 25. 
 98. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 91. 
 99. The 1972 Stockholm Conference signaled the international community’s recogni-
tion that development and environmental well-being were “inextricably linked” and pro-
vided the “impetus” for international and national legislation regarding these matters for 
the next three decades. UNEP ORGANIZATION PROFILE, UNEP 8, 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/UNEPOrganizationProfile.pdf (last visited May 18, 2012). It 
prompted the creation of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Id. at 
8–9. At Stockholm, Brazil assumed a “leading position” among developing countries that 
espoused concern that environmental consciousness would inhibit modernization. Leila 
da Costa Ferreira & Sergio B. F. Tavolaro, Environmental Concerns in Contemporary 
Brazil: An Insight into Some Theoretical and Societal Backgrounds (1970s – 1990s), 19 
INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 161, 165 (2008). This contingent of developing countries 
labeled industrialized nations as the primary polluters of the world and insisted that mod-
ernized countries should therefore pay the cost of cleanup and mitigation. Id. Brazil and 
other developing nations insisted that poverty and not “demographic growth” was the 
cause of environmental degradation. Id. 
 100. “Scholars tend to agree on the fact that SEMA was an indication that the govern-
ment’s approach to environmental problems was going to be a marginal one . . . Econom-
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The Animal Protection Law of 1967 offered a more promising step to-
wards biodiversity protection. Brazil’s endangered species lists and fines 
related to trafficking and hunting certain wild animals are based on this 
law.101 Though the Animal Protection Law provides the legal source of 
Brazil’s biological preserves, it was not until 1974 that the government 
established the first biological preserve.102 Actual biodiversity protec-
tions still lagged behind legislative pretensions. 
Other laws before Article 225 may have cleared a judicial path for en-
vironmental plaintiffs, but they did not explicitly address biodiversity. 
For instance, in 1985 The Law of Diffuse Interests improved citizen 
standing by allowing individuals to file suit when collectively-held re-
sources were improperly managed by the government.103 Again, howev-
er, environmental concerns, much less biodiversity protection, took a 
backseat to consumer interests.104 The law permitted citizens to protect 
collectively held patrimonies, including environmental patrimonies, but 
also included concerns not necessarily related to biodiversity such as his-
torical significance and tourism.105 Though the Law of Diffuse Interests 
was “revolutionary” in that courts became a forum for public participa-
tion instead of a venue for private conflicts, the law’s aim was to protect 
communal interests. Increased biodiversity protection was not the law’s 
goal. 
Considering the examples above, Brazilian environmental law before 
Article 225 complicated biodiversity protections but did not necessarily 
improve them or even admit that biodiversity was worth protecting. 
Hampered by development-driven, authoritarian regimes and lacking a 
programmatic cohesion focused on protecting biodiversity, environmen-
tal legislation prior to Article 225 was aimed at other goals. These goals 
only affected biodiversity as a consequence of effects concerning sepa-
rate issues which the legislation was intended to address. In light of Bra-
zil’s wealth of biodiversity, its importance, and the worldwide decline in 
biodiversity,106 a gaping void remained in Brazil’s biodiversity protec-
tion. Biodiversity required a statutory setting where it could outlast polit-
                                                                                                             
ic development remained the central pillar in the government’s political agenda.” Id. at 
166. 
 101. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 89. 
 102. Id. at 90–91. 
 103. At the time, such “strong standing” did not even exist in “developed” countries 
such as Germany. Id. at 94. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See supra Part I. 
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ical trends, seize the judiciary’s attention, compete with developmental 
agendas, and employ cohesive policy to channel an increasingly dense 
legislative framework. 
III. THE ARRIVAL OF ARTICLE 225 
The end of the military dictatorship in 1985107 offered an opportunity 
for the constitutional synthesis and codification of modern democratic 
ideals, including those which did not necessarily comply with the devel-
opmental agendas pursued by successive political regimes.108 The result 
was the 1988 Constitution.109 Considering its fundamental right, political 
policy statement, and rebalancing of property interests, Article 225 is the 
most significant article of the 1988 Constitution pertaining to the envi-
ronment.110 Increased activity on the part of environmental NGOs, an 
upsurge in protests specifically addressing Amazon deforestation, and 
swelling international pressure set the stage for Article 225.111 
In 1986, the two most prominent Brazilian environmental NGOs ap-
peared: the Atlantic Rainforest Foundation (“SOS”) and Foundation for 
Nature (“FUNATURA”).112 SOS epitomized the new generation of Bra-
zilian environmental NGOs: independent, practical, and professional.113 
FUNATURA, in contrast, represented an alliance between environmental 
government agencies and an environmental NGO.114 The founding of the 
                                                                                                             
 107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 108. Linda Chang, The New Emerald Hunters: Brazilian Environmental Jurispru-
dence, 1988-1989, 3 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 396 (1990). 
 109. Id. at 396. 
 110. Patriota, supra note 62, at 613. 
 111. Romano, supra note 19, at 74. The general rising awareness affecting all the pre-
ceding factors was largely made possible by satellite images, available for the first time 
in the 1980s, which revealed the of rainforest destruction. Kellman, supra note 19, at 150. 
 112. Romano, supra note 19, at 74. 
 113. KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET KECK, GREENING BRAZIL: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN STATE AND SOCIETY 102 (2007). SOS became one of the 
largest environmental NGOs in Brazil. By 1993, it had 6,600 “dues-paying” members, “a 
membership base large by Brazilian standards.” Id. at 103. By 1995, there were ten thou-
sand members, though eight thousand signed up through holding “affinity credit cards.” 
Id. SOS was “unusual among environmental organizations” because it did not accept 
“government money.” Id. According to SOS, there were “too many strings attached” to 
government money, and conflict with the government inevitably followed such funding. 
Id. at 104. Perhaps SOS’s reluctance indicates its cognizance of the government’s devel-
opment-driven “environmental” activity discussed in Part II of this Note. 
 114. Al Zachary Lazarus, A War Worth Fighting: The Ongoing Battle to Save the Bra-
zilian Amazon, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 399, 415 (2003). The founder of FUNATURA, 
Maria Teresa Padua, was a prominent conservationist in the IBDF. HOCHSTETLER & 
KECK, supra note 113, at 102. “Teaming with IBAMA,” Funatura has been involved in 
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Green Party in 1986115 further conditioned Brazil for the adoption of an 
environmental constitutional provision. The early members stressed the 
dual nature of the organization: it was to be both a party and a move-
ment. Proponents advocated a “self-governing ecological socialism.”116 
The Green Party remains the only political party fully devoted to an envi-
ronmental agenda.117 Therefore the Green Party’s emergence was symp-
tomatic of increased political toleration118 and a signal of the improved 
political legitimacy of an explicitly environmental agenda.119 
Besides domestic consciousness, increased international awareness120 
of habitat loss in Brazil during the years leading up to the 1988 Constitu-
                                                                                                             
debt-for-nature transactions as well as policy programs and education aimed at mitigating 
Amazon deforestation. Lazarus, supra, at 415. The Brazilian Institute of the Environment 
and Renewable Natural Resources (“IBAMA”) is Brazil’s “major executive environmen-
tal agency.” Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 96. A debt-for-nature swap is 
“generally when a country agrees not to develop certain tracts of land for a reduction of a 
specified amount of debt.” David Allen Reisman, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Brazil: Re-
sponse to World Pressure to Protect the Amazon, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 397, 
405 (1992–1993). FUNATURA participated in Brazil’s first debt-for-nature program in 
1992. Id. at 416. As we shall see, Article 225 (1988) preceded the government’s creation 
of IBAMA (1989) and first debt-for-nature swap. See Drummond & Barros-Platiau, su-
pra note 63, at 96. While SOS and FUNATURA helped establish a political and social 
climate favorable to adopting Article 225, Article 225 has doubtlessly influenced these 
NGOs’ activities due to impacts described in Part IV. Arlindo Daibert notes that “envi-
ronmental participation boomed” after the new constitution and by 1989 there were 700 
“environmental NGOs.” Daibert, supra note 63, at 837. 
 115. Eventful 1986 was also the year when Chico Mendes rose to prominence as a 
champion of sustainable development. Daibert, supra note 63, at 836. Mendes’ assassina-
tion in December 1988 helped to keep environmental issues at the forefront of interna-
tional and domestic political discourse. Mendes was murdered by ranchers opposing the 
“powerful grassroots environmental upsurge” at the time. Chang, supra note 108, at 398. 
 116. The “socialist” and “counterculture” components of the party’s program caused 
schisms between environmentalists and inhibited the party’s growth. See HOCHSTETLER & 
KECK, supra note 113, at 91–92. 
 117. Brazil’s Green Party to Remain Neutral in Runoff Vote, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11562247 [hereinafter 
Brazil’s Green Party Neutral in Vote]. 
 118. HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 113, at 86. 
 119. The issue’s legitimacy continues to gain momentum. In the 2010 presidential 
election, the Green Party polled 20% of the vote. Brazil’s Green Party Neutral in Vote, 
supra note 117. 
 120. The nexus of international law and environmental regulation in Brazil cannot be 
fairly assessed without mentioning possible setbacks due to increased international atten-
tion. Both the Brazilian government and scholars have criticized the narrowness and sim-
plicity with which international media and journalists have at times portrayed the envi-
ronmental problem in Brazil. The international media’s preoccupation with the Amazon 
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tion was certainly a factor in the creation of Article 225.121 During the 
1970s, scientific journals began reporting on deforestation in the Ama-
zon.122 Through the early 1980s, mainstream media, including the New 
York Times, reported on intensifying deforestation.123 International criti-
cism focused on Brazil124 and is perhaps indicative of the failure and in-
auspiciousness of Brazilian biodiversity legislation before Article 225. 
Increased environmental consciousness and a rise in habitat loss125 led 
to the immediate impetus and early version of Article 225:126 the Popular 
Amendment on Environmental Protection (“Popular Amendment”).127 
The signers128 of the Popular Amendment were largely driven by conser-
vation organizations.129 Yet the document was supported by the “largest 
                                                                                                             
is disproportionate compared to its coverage of other significant Brazilian issues, includ-
ing gang-violence, education, and economic development. See generally Romano, supra 
note 19 (sampling some of the views above and summarizing Brazil’s position in the 
international environmental regime). Other critics have opined that concern abroad for 
Brazil’s deforestation crises is simply a guise for developed nations to reassert political 
and economic hegemony over Brazil (“eco-imperialism”). See Andrew Harrell, The Poli-
tics of Amazonian Deforestation, 23 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 197 (1991) (describing critiques 
of international intervention and the underlying neo-realist international-relations theory 
hampering foreign efforts to curb deforestation in Brazil); Emilio Moran, The Law, Poli-
tics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforestation, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 
404 (1994) [hereinafter Moran, Law, Politics, and Economics] (suggesting that Brazil, 
even more so than other former colonies in Latin America, exhibits “hypersensitivity” 
when its national sovereignty is challenged under environmental auspices). Furthermore, 
international capital has facilitated much of the environmental degradation. For example, 
between 1992 and 1993, “foreign companies” in Brazil (often Brazilian companies in 
name but wholly backed by foreign capital) were responsible for “100% of the gold min-
ing, 98% of the silver mining, 92% of the diamond mining, 85% of the nickel mining, 
48% of the iron mining, and 85% of the bauxite mining.” Karen M. Schwab, Added Hope 
for the Amazon Rainforest, 15 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 163, 178 (1992–1993). 
 121. Edesio Fernandes, Constitutional Environmental Rights in Brazil, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 265 (1996) [hereinafter Fer-
nandes, Constitutional Environmental Rights in Brazil]. 
 122. Moran, Deforestation and Land Use, supra note 36, at 9. 
 123. Id. at 10. 
 124. Romano, supra note 19, at 73. 
 125. See supra pp. 721–23. 
 126. Edesio Fernandes, Law, Politics, and Environmental Protection in Brazil, 4 J. 
ENVTL. L. 41, 52 (1992) [hereinafter Fernandes, Law, Politics, and Environmental Pro-
tection in Brazil]. 
 127. Id. 
 128. The environmental caucus managed to rally sixty of the five hundred and fifty 
congressmen responsible for writing the new constitution. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, 
supra note 63, at 95. 
 129. Fernandes, Law, Politics, and Environmental Protection in Brazil, supra note 
126, at 52. 
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social mobilization” in Brazil’s history up until that time.130 Considering 
the sweeping contents of Article 225, the broad base of support repre-
sented a substantial surge of public concern for biodiversity. 
Article 225 provides that everyone has a right to an “ecologically bal-
anced environment.”131 Biodiversity is an intrinsic feature of this right as 
evident in Paragraph 1, Clause II. Clause II indicates that in order to en-
sure the “effectiveness” of the right to an “ecologically balanced envi-
ronment,” the government must “preserve the diversity and integrity of 
the genetic patrimony of the country and  control entities engaged in re-
search and manipulation of genetic material.”132 Article 225 attaches a 
duty both to the government and community to maintain the “ecological-
ly balanced environment” for “present and future generations.”133 There-
fore the constitution declares both a fundamental right and a policy.134 
Additionally, the new environmental provision attempted to establish a 
constitutional base by which expansive preexisting environmental legis-
lation could be standardized.135 
Article 225 also characterized “national patrimony” as a constitutional 
check on traditional and formidable private property prerogatives.136 The 
“national patrimony”137 described in Article 225, Paragraph 4, falls with-
in the collective property of the nation and thus is subject to regulation 
by the government at the expense of private interests.138 The framers of 
Article 225 intended the practical result of this arrangement to be that 
juridical goods would be distinguished from property rights with greater 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. at 52. 
 131. C.F. art. 225 (Braz.). 
 132. Id. art. 225, para. 2, cl. 2. 
 133. Id. art. 225. 
 134. Ernest Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental 
Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
78 (1992) [hereinafter Brandl & Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment]. 
 135. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 95. 
 136. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 137. C.F. art. 225, para. 4 (Braz.). “National patrimony,” is equivalent to “public do-
minion” and “public dominion” is defined by the jurisdiction a state has over everything 
and everyone in its territory. Andrea Steuer Zago & Lionel Pimentel Nobre, The Brazili-
an Citizen Constitution, the Environment and Taxation, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
507, 518, 519 (1997–1998). The government can protect “public dominion” by regulating 
“private and public property” and expropriating private property. Id. at 518. 
 138. Zago & Nobre, supra note 137, at 519. John Tucker goes further in characterizing 
“national patrimony,” suggesting that the 1988 Constitution accorded those areas desig-
nated “national patrimony” “the strongest possible legal status.” John C. Tucker, Consti-
tutional Codification of An Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REV. 299, 313 (2000). 
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deference accorded to juridical goods.139 Where Article 225 says that the 
“ecologically balanced environment” is “property intended for one com-
mon use for the People,” private property rights become subordinated to 
the public dominion doctrine.140 Ernst Brandl and Hartwin Bungert clas-
sify Article 225’s environmental right141 as a “social fundamental 
right.”142 Such a classification implies that Article 225’s right is not indi-
vidually enforceable and thus useless unless viewed in the larger “consti-
tutional framework.”143 
The “constitutional framework” supporting the environmental right in-
cludes Articles 23144 and 24145 of the 1988 Constitution. Article 23 man-
dates that “the Union, the States, and the Federal District, and the munic-
ipalities, in common, have the power to . . . protect the environment and 
fight pollution in any of its forms” and “preserve the forests, fauna, and 
flora.”146 Article 24 permits the various levels of government to exercise 
power concurrently.147 Article 26 declares all natural terrain to be the 
property148 of Brazil’s federated states.149 Emilio Moran describes the 
practical result of the three articles as forming an overarching environ-
                                                                                                             
 139. “For example, a person can own a forest, but the use of this land is still subject to 
the environmental protection rules. These rules trump the property right of the owner.” 
Zago & Nobre, supra note 137, at 519. Zago and Nobre seem to view “juridical goods” 
as the legal right of common use which trumps private claims over the same property. Id. 
 140. Id. at 519; see also Roger W. Findley, Sustainable Development in Latin Ameri-
can Rainforests and the Role of Law, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1997). 
 141. As opposed to Article 225’s policy directive. See C.F. art. 225 (Braz.). 
 142. Brandl & Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment, supra note 134, at 78. 
 143. Id. But some observers suggest that Article 225 launched the “environment” into 
the status of “autonomous juridical entity, entitled to certain rights.” Zago & Nobre, su-
pra note 137, at 518. While those rights are “unidentifiable,” they are nevertheless “en-
forceable.” Id. at 519. The contradiction inherent in Zago & Nobre’s analysis (unidentifi-
able yet enforceable rights) creates a puzzling concept of the “environment” as a rights-
invested entity. Facially, “everyone” possessing a right to an “ecologically balanced envi-
ronment” indicates an anthropological right and suggests that Article 225 does not envi-
sion the “environment” as an independent legal entity. 
 144. C.F. art. 23 (Braz.). 
 145. Id. art. 24. 
 146. Id. art. 23. 
 147. Id. art. 24. 
 148. Emilio Moran suggests the social function of property is a muddy area of Brazili-
an law that as of yet has not afforded much environmental protection. Moran, Law, Poli-
tics, and Economics, supra note 120, at 397, 401. Though Article 26 has acted as a 
springboard for legislation criminalizing the destruction of state property, Moran con-
cludes that such proscriptions are rarely enforced in the environmental context. Id. at 399. 
 149. C.F. art. 26 (Braz.). 
2012] BRAZIL & BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION 733 
  
mental policy direction which leaves details to states’ and counties’ dis-
cretions.150 
Other articles composing Article 225’s supportive framework temper 
developmental agendas. Drummond and Barros-Platia see the inclusion 
of both an environmental right and consumer protection in the 1988 Con-
stitution’s economic program as a counterbalance against the persistent 
force of economic development.151 Article 174 endorses prospecting and 
mining cooperatives so long as cooperatives consider “protection of the 
environment.”152 Article 216 includes locations of “ecological” value in 
its definition of cultural property.153 
Several judicial mechanisms within the 1988 Constitution also affect 
the environmental framework outlined above. Article 129 grants the 
Ministério Público (“Public Prosecution”)154 power to “institute civil in-
vestigation and public civil suit to protect public and social property, the 
environment, and other diffuse and collective interests.”155 New proce-
dural tools expanded the scope of remedies available to courts. Such 
tools include the Writ of Injunction,156 the Direct Action of Unconstitu-
tionality,157 and the Collective Writ of Security.158 
                                                                                                             
 150. The outcome is a disproportionate responsibility for conservation in the hands of 
local governments that often do not have the capital or political will to protect biodiversi-
ty. Moran, Law, Politics, and Economics, supra note 120, at 399. But see Rosenn, supra 
note 94, at 583 (claiming that “virtually all important legislation” consists of “federal 
statutes that apply uniformly throughout Brazil”). 
 151. See Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 95. 
 152. C.F. art. 174 (Braz.). 
 153. Id. art. 216. 
 154. The Public Prosecution is the major institution responsible for prosecuting crimes 
perpetrated against the public interest. It includes ministries at the federal, state, and local 
level. See Augusto Zimmerman, How Brazilian Judges Undermine the Rule of Law: A 
Critical Appraisal, 11 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 179, 186 (2008); see also LESLEY K. 
MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 63–66, 71–76 (2008) (describing the increased political inde-
pendence, career security for prosecutors, and fiscal autonomy gained by the Public Pros-
ecution due to the 1988 Constitution). 
 155. C.F. art. 129, cl. IV (Braz.). 
 156. The Writ of Injunction permits plaintiffs to bring an action against the govern-
ment when its failure to legislate leads to a breach of constitutional rights. See id. art. 5, 
cl. LXXI. 
 157. The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality broadened the number of government 
officials and institutions which are able to initiate charges of unconstitutionality against 
the government. See id. art. 103. Before the 1988 constitution, only a federal attorney 
general could file an unconstitutional charge directly with the Brazilian Supreme Court. 
MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 230 n.33. However, the increased litigious freedom of 
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Finally, the Constitution relaxed standing restrictions in order to em-
brace the new liberal consensus.159 “Any citizen” was granted the right to 
file suit for the purpose of protecting the “environment.”160 The “Public 
Civil Action” became an instrument for defending “collective inter-
ests.”161 The broadening of standing has led to a wide array of unprece-
dented rights based on collective property.162 
IV. THE SUCCESS OF ARTICLE 225 
A. Obstacles to Enforcing Article 225 
Despite domestic and international approval, legal scholarship has fo-
cused on implementation difficulties rather than the positive effects of 
Article 225.163 The major obstacles to implementation are widely recog-
nized and often associated with developing countries.164 These impedi-
ments pervade Brazil’s institutions from the center of national power to 
the smallest townships. Local politicians165 adhere to developmental in-
terests more so than the needs of biodiversity.166 These politicians remain 
popular because local residents are typically less concerned with protect-
ing biodiversity than the environmentally-conscious elite located in cities 
                                                                                                             
government entities has sometimes been viewed as an instigator of institutional instability 
and legislative deadlock. Id. at 175. 
 158. The Collective Writ of Security invested political parties, unions, and professional 
associations with the power to challenge the constitutionality of government actions. C.F. 
art. 5, cl. LXX (Braz.). Keith Rosenn has termed this writ “a sensible step in the direction 
of a class action.” Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient 
Constitutionalism for a Transnational Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 794 (1990) [here-
inafter Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution]. 
 159. See MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 167. 
 160. C.F. art. 5, cl. LXXIII (Braz.). 
 161. Id. art. 129, cl. III. The original Public Civil Action became law in 1985 and 
serves as an example of where the 1988 Constitution has functioned to “strengthen and 
reinforce key environmental legislation” predating Article 225. Chang, supra note 108, at 
397. 
 162. See MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 168. 
 163. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Municipalities in Brazil possess far more environmental regulatory authority than 
in most other federal republics, including the United States. Antonio Herman Benjamin & 
Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Market Incentives for Environmental Policy in Brazil 
and the United States, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 67, 74 (1997). 
 166. Often the strongest environmental NGOs are based in cities, far from the most 
threatened habitats under control of local politicians. Findley, supra note 140, at 142. 
However, Janelle Kellman notes that many local politicians do not believe the federal 
government does enough to support local environmental initiatives. Kellman, supra note 
19, at 159. 
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distant from deforestation hotspots.167 At the national level, the govern-
ment still provides subsidies for unsustainable development and thus mo-
tivates local populations to remain indifferent to habitat destruction.168 
Environmental agencies are both underfunded169 and understaffed.170 The 
agencies’ employees often lack technical expertise and training necessary 
for carrying out their duties.171 
The Brazilian judiciary172 exhibits some similar problems. It is limited 
in its ability to enforce biodiversity protections because of traditions 
marked by conservatism and public indifference.173 Judges are not at-
tuned to environmental concepts such as sustainable development.174 The 
lawyers arguing before these judges receive an unspecialized legal edu-
cation, which, despite attempts at reform, remains “formalistic, rhetori-
cal, conservative, and largely unspecialized.”175 Polluting parties often 
threaten and harass public prosecutors attempting to enforce environmen-
tal regulations, thus discouraging increased participation in protecting 
biodiversity.176 Janelle Kellman177 opines that “[a]s a whole, lawyers in 
Brazil seem to lack commitment to lasting social change.”178 
                                                                                                             
 167. However, local residents who “live off the forest in its natural state” have at times 
been exceptionally proactive in protecting habitats. Findley, supra note 140, at 14. 
 168. Id. at 14. 
 169. For example, in 1998 the federal government allotted just $8 million to regulating 
the Amazon rainforest out of a $1.6 billion environmental budget. Romano, supra note 
19, at 84.The disproportionate inattention to the Amazon’s needs becomes clear if one 
considers that the Amazon Rainforest covers 58% of Brazil’s overall land mass. Kellman, 
supra note 19, at 147. In 2002, the Ministry of the Environment received less funding 
than every other federal agency. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 101. 
 170. During 2001, IBAMA had only 275 inspectors and 1 helicopter available for reg-
ulating 5.1 million km2 of forest. Kellman, supra note 19, at 160. 
 171. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 3. 
 172. Of course the “judiciary” must be distinguished from the laws it is charged with 
enforcing. Overall, the environmental laws are “satisfactory” in Brazil. Fernandes, Law, 
Politics, and Environmental Protection in Brazil, supra note 126, at 41. In regards to 
deforestation currently taking place in the Amazon, 90% is illegal. See Last Gasp for the 
Forest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 2009, at 95. 
 173. Kellman, supra note 19, at 160. Lesley McAllister remarks that in Latin America 
the “(un)rule of law” predominates. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 12. When “rule of 
law” exists, it ferments a “legal-cultural aspect” in which parties rely on the predictability 
and enforcement of law in making decisions and calculations. Id. Such “rule of law” is 
doubtful in Brazil because most people consider the law “on paper” as unreliable. Id. 
 174. The judicial system also suffers from “homogeneity.” Most of the judges are 
young, male, and affluent. Kellman, supra note 19, at 161–62. 
 175. Id. at 163. 
 176. Id. at 164. 
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In both political and legal settings, corruption often skews the resolu-
tion of adversarial situations.179 Personal social relations are often more 
important to the outcome of legislative action and court decisions than 
legality or public interest.180 Some critics blame the drafting and struc-
ture of the 1988 Constitution for enforcement difficulties.181 All these 
obstacles tempt analysts to underrate the significance of Article 225. 
Though these obstacles obstruct Article 225’s implementation, they 
should not detract from the Article 225’s monumental and groundbreak-
ing impact. Occasionally flawed enforcement does not outweigh the nu-
merous circumstances in which Article 225 has been successfully en-
forced. 
B. Article 225’s Success: Legislation 
Legislation stemming from Article 225 has created highly-active and 
powerful environmental agencies, extensive preservations and parks, 
strengthened pre-existing legislation, galvanized political regimes at the 
national and local levels, and blocked legislation harmful to biodiversity. 
Before Article 225, environmental laws in Brazil were unconsolidated 
and aimless, lacking an overarching national policy goal.182 Though the 
focus of Article 225 was largely based upon statutes promulgated since 
the 1970s, the paramount status of Article 225 as a pioneer in the consti-
tutional context is unassailable.183 Before Article 225, no previous Bra-
zilian constitution included a distinct right to a “protected environ-
ment”184 and most government conservation actions required complicat-
                                                                                                             
 177. Current associate with Stoel Rives LLP and former project associate with the 
Environmental Change and Security Project at the Smithsonian Institute. Id. at 145. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 12. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution, supra note 158, at 779–80 (cri-
tiquing the 1988 Constitution for sloppy drafting, its programmatic nature, lack of a uni-
fied policy, and internal conflicting political ideologies). 
 182. Fernandes, Constitutional Environmental Rights in Brazil, supra note 121, at 265. 
 183. Though Jose Drummond and Ana Baros-Platiau indicate that the “scope” of Arti-
cle 225 was “based mainly” on prior laws, they acknowledge that Article 225 was a 
“breakthrough as the Brazilian Constitution itself now recognized serious environmental 
limitations to the ever-popular goal of development.” Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra 
note 63, at 95; see also Chang supra note 108, at 397 (“One effect of this Constitution has 
been to strengthen and reinforce key environmental legislation enacted during the earlier 
years of the decade, as ecological awareness slowly found its way into the political main-
stream.”). 
 184. Fernandes, Law, Politics, and Environmental Protection in Brazil, supra note 
126, at 44. 
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ed conceptual justifications.185 These justifications usually related to pub-
lic health or economics.186 Therefore, most biodiversity protections were 
limited by their dependence on human health and economic needs. There 
were no criminal, administrative, or civil liabilities associated with envi-
ronmental harms.187 Article 225 not only created these responsibilities 
but also spawned the agencies charged with fulfilling them. 
The most significant of the new agencies is the Brazilian Institute of 
the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (“IBAMA”).188 
IBAMA absorbed four pre-existing federal agencies, the IBDF, SEMA, 
the Superintendency for Fisheries, and the Superintendency of Rubber.189 
IBAMA now implements the federal government’s full range of envi-
ronmental duties, including conservation, regulation, sustainable practic-
es, and general authority.190 The agency is a “direct consequence of the 
1988 Constitution’s provisions and of the encompassing outlook on envi-
ronmental issues that informs them.”191 The effect of uniting disparate 
government agencies, each with a particularized environmental compo-
nent, reflects Article 225’s consolidating force. In the same way Article 
225 presents a supreme environmental right and policy, so too has 
IBAMA joined once separate agencies to form a cohesive environmental 
front. 
Article 225 has reached into IBAMA’s conservation program. Law 
9.985, creating the National System of Conservation Units (“SNUC”),192 
is one of the most crucial legislative contributions of Article 225.193 Bio-
diversity protections loom large in SNUC, which is intended to “contrib-
ute to the conservation of biological diversity and genetic resources, pro-
                                                                                                             
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra pp. 725–29 and note 62. 
 187. Fernandes, Law, Politics, and Environmental Protection in Brazil, supra note 
126, at 44. 
 188. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 96. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. But see HOCHSTETLER & KECK, supra note 113, at 36 (opining that “pressur[e] 
by foreign environmentalists and their governments to slow the massive deforestation of 
the Amazon rainforest” caused President Sarney to create IBAMA). 
 192. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 98. But see Crawford & Pignata-
ro, supra note 21 (claiming international conventions, including the UN Convention on 
Biodiversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosecurity, NEP, and other pre-1988 domes-
tic laws, provided most of the impetus behind SNUC). In fact, most conservation units 
appeared between 1964 and 1984 during the reign of military dictatorship. Id. at 331. The 
multiplicity of legal authorities alleged to have established SNUC highlights the need for 
an overall national programmatic scheme which was lacking before Article 225. 
 193. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 98. 
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tect threatened species, promote sustainable development based on natu-
ral resources, and stimulate the use of conservation principles and prac-
tices in the process of economic development.”194 SNUC created two 
general categories of conservation units: Complete Protection Conserva-
tion Units and Sustainable Conservation Units.195 The Complete Protec-
tion category includes various subcategories of conservation unit: Eco-
logical Stations,196 National Parks,197 Natural Monuments,198 and Wild-
life Refuges.199 The Sustainable Conservation category includes Envi-
ronmental Protection Areas,200 Areas of Relevant Environmental Inter-
est,201 National Forests,202 Extractive Reserves,203 Fauna Reserves,204 
Sustainable Development Reserves,205 and Private Reserves of National 
                                                                                                             
 194. Id. 
 195. Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 35. 
 196. Ecological Stations and Biologic Reserves are intended to deter the presence of 
humans to the utmost extent. They are intended for research and education only. Id. at 38. 
 197. National Parks are intended to facilitate recreation, tourism, scientific research, 
and education at locations containing “highly-valued natural ecosystems” and “scenic 
beauty.” Id. at 39. 
 198. Natural Monuments are distinguishable from other “Complete Protection” units 
because they permit private property within their boundaries. Id. at 39. 
 199. Wildlife Refuges are explicitly designed for encouraging the reproduction of local 
plants and both local and migratory animals. Id. at 40. 
 200. The underlying objective of the “Environmental Protection Area” is the protection 
of biodiversity. Id. at 41. It consists of areas which are very small or possess no human 
populations yet nevertheless offer resources essential to the health and happiness of the 
human population. Id. The Environmental Protection Area includes private and public 
property and is especially important in urban areas. Id. 
 201. Areas of Relevant Environmental Interest are usually small zones containing “ex-
traordinary” or rare “biota.” Areas of Relevant Environmental Interest include public and 
private property. Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 42. “Biota” is “the combined 
flora, fauna, and microorganisms of a given region.” WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE, 
supra note 1, at 393. 
 202. National Forests consist of areas containing mostly native species, but which 
permit sustainable use and research. National Forests do not include private property. 
Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 21, at 43. 
 203. Extractive Reserves are intended to protect areas where populations rely on tradi-
tional land-uses to maintain their historical cultures. Id. at 45. Extractive reserves em-
brace a facet of current Brazilian environmental law that seeks to protect cultural as well 
as ecological integrity. Id. They include only public lands. Id. 
 204. Fauna Reserves are areas containing native species specifically distinguished by 
scientific studies. Id. at 47. As of 2007, none had been established by the Brazilian gov-
ernment, though they are very similar to Extractive Reserves. Id. They do not include 
private property. Id. 
 205. Sustainable Development Reserves contain “traditional” human populations 
whose existence has been based on sustainable use since prior generations. Id. at 47. Sim-
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Patrimony.206 “Complete Protection Conservation Units” are distin-
guished by their biocentric concerns, while “Sustainable Conservation 
Units” represent anthropological concerns related to resource conserva-
tion.207 
The effect of Article 225 on SNUC is similar to its effect in regards to 
IBAMA. Article 225 did not necessarily pave the way for groundbreak-
ing environmental legislation, but instead consolidated and buttressed a 
preexisting system.208 Dictatorship-era conservation units were frequent-
ly created solely to fulfill preconditions for international investment.209 
Now Article 225 offers an environmental foundation to justify creating 
conservation units.210 In delivering a constitutional mandate to protect the 
environment for the purpose of preserving biodiversity, Article 225 pre-
sents alternative values to those of unbridled economic development. 
Thus Article 225 yields an ideological benefit extending beyond federal 
agencies, an advantage which will be discussed in Part D below. 
The new constitutional environmental values influenced criminal law. 
Article 225 produced the Environmental Crimes Act of 1998,211 which 
many lawyers laud as “one of the most modern and comprehensive legal 
texts focusing on environmental crime.”212 Janelle Kellman, though not-
ing that the bill’s original incarnation was watered down in Congress,213 
has said it does represent an “important step” towards conserving the 
                                                                                                             
ilar to Extractive Reserves, they permit private uses by local populations but no private 
land may exist in a Sustainable Development Reserve. Id. at 48. 
 206. Private Reserves of National Patrimony consist of private land in which preserva-
tion of biodiversity is guaranteed. Id. at 49. It is similar to a conservation easement in the 
United States, where the duty to conserve is perpetual. Id. 
 207. Id. at 36. 
 208. Id. at 31. 
 209. “Formal legal steps were taken, but not substantially enforced.” Id. at 31. 
 210. Findley, supra note 140, at 14 (linking ecological zoning and extractive reserves 
to the discussion of “national patrimony” in Article 225). 
 211. Jose Leite & Marcelo Dantas point to Article 225, Paragraph 3, as the constitu-
tional mandate for the Environmental Crimes Act. Jose Morato Leite & Marcelo Buzaglo 
Dantas, Environmental Damages and Crimes: Brazil and Environmental Damage, 15 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2002); C.F. art. 225, para. 3 (Braz.) (“Procedures and activities 
considered as harmful to the environment shall subject the infractors, be they individuals 
or legal entities, to penal and administrative sanctions, without prejudice to the obligation 
to repair the damages caused.”). 
 212. Div. of Env’t Law & Conventions, Brazil’s Environmental Crimes Law UNEP, 
http://unep.org/dec/onlinemanual/Enforcement/NationalLawsRegulations/AppropriatePe
nalties/Resource/tabid/792/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
 213. Kellman, supra note 19, at 156 (“Government leaders in Congress substantially 
weakened the law to mollify ranching and industrial special interests opposed to it.”). 
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rainforest.214 The law granted IBAMA statutory power to enforce envi-
ronmental law,215 defined various kinds of environmental crimes,216 and 
established corresponding fines.217 The law holds government officials 
accountable for omitting or falsifying environmentally-relevant infor-
mation in permitting processes.218 It forbids companies from obtaining 
certain government subsidies and tax breaks if such companies have a 
criminal environmental history.219 Similar to Article 225’s effect on both 
SNUC and IBAMA, the Environmental Crimes Act also served to con-
solidate and solidify antecedent environmental law.220  
Even when the government’s primary intent behind particular legisla-
tion is not to protect biodiversity, Article 225 advances the goal of con-
servation. In 1988, President Sarney announced the Our Nature program, 
which he claimed was intended to realize the unprecedented environmen-
tal priorities of the 1988 Constitution.221 Critics cautioned that President 
Sarney was more concerned with deflecting international criticism than 
protecting biodiversity.222 Whether or not President Sarney was sincere 
in his desire to uphold Article 225, Article 225 offered a constitutional 
mandate to hold before the public eye. Therefore, the common criticism 
that Article 225 is merely a “declaration of intent” may be insufficient to 
detract from Article 225’s success as a political and legal force. Aside 
from establishing both a policy statement and fundamental right, Article 
225’s presence in the federal constitution legitimizes government initia-
tives. Our Nature led to the repeal of tax-incentives and loans for eco-
nomic development in the Amazon, moratoriums on deforestation for 
agriculture and cattle grazing, a ban on exports of raw-timber, and im-
proved enforcement and regulation.223 
                                                                                                             
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. The crimes include “mistreatment or killing of wild animals, deforestation, pollu-
tion, and destruction of historical preservation sites.” MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 26. 
 217. Some fines were set as high as $50 million for illegal use of land and forbidden 
activities such as burning. Romano, supra note 19, at 83. Other penalties included im-
prisonment, house arrest, sanctions, and community service. MCALLISTER, supra note 
154, at 26. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Romano, supra note 19, at 83. 
 220. In addition to the points already mentioned, the law also criminalized administra-
tive misconduct and attached liability to corporations, government agencies, and govern-
ment employees. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 46–47, 93. 
 221. Schwab, supra note 120, at 200. 
 222. Michael S. Serrill & John Maier, Environment: A Dubious Plan for the Amazon, 
TIME (Apr. 17, 1989), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957443-
2,00.html. 
 223. Schwab, supra note 120, at 200. 
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To gain a comprehensive understanding of Article 225’s influence on 
legislation in Brazil, one must consider legislation prevented by the Arti-
cle. For example, in 2005, the Mato Grosso State Assembly blocked a 
law which would have permitted construction of sugar and ethanol plants 
near the Pantanal.224 State Assemblyman Pedro Kemp indicated that the 
Pantanal’s constitutional status as “national patrimony”225 was at the 
heart of the seventeen to four vote against approving the plants.226 The 
Pantanal’s protected status prevailed against state agendas aimed at pro-
ducing biofuels (ethanol in particular) and job creation.227 The vote rep-
resents a victory for biodiversity protection—a victory in which biodi-
versity triumphed over powerful economic interests. A legislative body 
had directly invoked Article 225 to thwart the traditional priority of de-
velopment. 
The Mato Grosso State Assembly’s affirmation of Article 225 demon-
strates how Article 225 has pervaded the federal structure of Brazil. Arti-
cle 23228 and Article 30229 provide municipalities with environmental 
enforcement power.230 Localities have begun to implement Article 225 
through establishing “Municipal Environmental Councils” which analyze 
environmental impact statements (“EIS”) regarding local projects.231 
Wealthy towns in particular have begun to flex environmental constitu-
tional powers232 and their successes demonstrate that while impediments 
to enforcement are present (e.g. budgetary restrictions at the local level), 
Article 255 facilitates enforcement. Fiscal deficiencies in certain regions 
do not necessarily bar environmental enforcement in richer localities. 
                                                                                                             
 224. Brazil State Legislature Votes down Law to Allow Biofuel Plants near Wetland 
Area, 28 INT’L. ENV’T. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 909 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Brazil State 
Legislature Votes Down Biofuel Plants Law]. Environmentalists alleged that a liquid 
residue from the sugar plant would “kill tonnes of fish” and create an “ecological imbal-
ance.” Id. The sugar and ethanol plants would have been located on the Paraguay River 
Basin, an area adjacent to the Pantanal but not within the Pantanal itself. Id. 
 225. C.F. art. 225, para. 4 (Braz.). 
 226. Brazil State Legislature Votes down Biofuel Plants Law, supra note 224. 
 227. Id. 
 228. C.F. art. 23 (Braz.). 
 229. “The Municipalities have the power to: I—legislate upon matters of local inter-
est.” Id. art. 30. 
 230. Weiss, supra note 165, at 74. 
 231. Id. EIS are mandated by Article 225, Paragraph. 1, Clause IV. See C.F. art. 225, 
para. 1, cl. IV (Braz.). 
 232. See Weiss, supra note 165, at 74. 
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C. Article 225’s Success: The Judiciary 
The 1988 Constitution signaled a fresh era in judicial interpretation of 
constitutional issues. As early as 1990, this era of constitutional envi-
ronmental law had “legitimized a new class of plaintiffs: individuals, 
associations, and other entities bringing suit in the diffuse public inter-
est—with no attendant need to show damage specifically to members of 
the association.”233 This institutional shift was not legally reliant upon 
Article 225,234 yet its influence must be acknowledged.235 Article 225 has 
permeated the practices of lawyers and the outlook of judges. 
Judges are now willing to make more policy decisions and address so-
cial issues.236 The improved receptivity of the judiciary has expanded 
opportunities for government prosecutors237 to exercise professional re-
sponsibilities directly traceable to Article 225. Government prosecutors 
view the 1988 Constitution’s environmental provisions “to be compre-
hensive and clear, particularly with regard to the government’s obligation 
to protect the environment.”238 If there is a violation of an environmental 
law and no sanction to be brought against the actor, government prosecu-
tors generally feel that they have failed in their duty.239 Government 
prosecutors wield Article 225 to whittle down the discretionary powers 
of agencies and subject such agencies to the unbending standards of con-
stitutional law.240 When the 1988 Constitution conveys a right, according 
to these prosecutors, there is no room for “administrative discretion.”241 
Conselho Estadual do Meio Ambiente-CONDEMA v. G. G. Miner-
açāo, Ltda.242 marked an early opportunity to observe how the new con-
stitutional environmental right would fare against constitutional private 
                                                                                                             
 233. Id. at 408. 
 234. The right to bring suit in the public’s “diffuse interests” was established by the 
Public Civil Action Law, passed in 1985. See supra p. 729 and note 103. 
 235. For example, Renato Guimaraes, Jr. specifically cites Article 225 as grounds for 
foreign citizens to claim standing in Brazil when bringing suit regarding environmental 
damages. Chang, supra note 108, at 409. 
 236. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 168–69. 
 237. For a discussion of Brazilian environmental prosecutors and their duties, process-
es, legal outlooks, and professional frustrations, see generally id. 
 238. Id. at 142; see also C.F. art. 225 (Braz.) (containing: “Government and the com-
munity shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations” 
and subdivision and Paragraph 1: “In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is 
incumbent upon the Government to . . . [government duties I through VII]”). 
 239. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 142–43. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. T.J.M.G., Civ., 640 REVISTA DOS TRIBUNAIS [R.T.], 21.02.1989, 169 (Braz.); see 
Chang, supra note 108, at 400. 
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property rights, the government’s constitutional duty to promote mining, 
and the constitutional right to “freely practice one’s profession.”243 State 
and municipal prosecutors succeeded in affirming an administrative or-
der which closed a mine suspected of poisoning water in the Pantanal.244 
The court nearly summarily upheld the administrative order, describing 
the Pantanal as a “vital ecological sanctuary.”245 The Pantanal’s highly 
visible richness in unique biodiversity was likely decisive in the court’s 
decision to uphold one constitutional right—Article 225’s “ecologically 
balanced environment”—at the expense of constitutional rights guaran-
teeing free enterprise and the government’s duty to pursue economic de-
velopment.246 Due to Article 225, biodiversity now shares constitutional 
ground with competing economic interests in the eyes of the judiciary. 
The new constitutional force behind biodiversity protection was even 
more apparent in Municipalidade de Águas de Santa Bárbara v. Ministé-
rio Público,247 in which municipal authorities in São Paolo sought to 
build an industrial complex on a site that the state of São Paolo had ac-
corded ecological preserve status.248 In an unexpected approach, the 
court divided the issues of property ownership and potential ecological 
damage.249 Next, rather than weigh these two issues equally, the court 
focused entirely on ecological damage.250 The court turned to a third par-
ty (the state military police) for an assessment of such damage.251 It thus 
isolated and tackled environmental damage in order to grant an injunc-
tion to prevent ongoing deforestation before it undertook the time-
consuming and complex process of balancing land ownership rights and 
ecological integrity.252 
In both G. G. Mineraçāo, Ltda. and Municipalidade de Águas de Santa 
Bárbara, cases decided within two years of Article 225’s arrival, the new 
ecological right to a balanced environment already proved to be a formi-
dable counterweight against private property interests and developmental 
rights. The cases predated much of the environmental legislation dating 
                                                                                                             
 243. Chang, supra note 108, at 402. 
 244. Id. at 400. 
 245. Id. at 403. 
 246. Id. 
 247. T.J.S.P., Civ., 637 R.T., 22.09.1988, 80 (Braz.); see Chang, supra note 108, at 
400. 
 248. Chang, supra note 108, at 410. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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 252. Id. at 411. 
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from the 1990s which “actualized” the environmental right,253 thus illus-
trating Article 225’s role as an operative statute in and of itself. 
Often, however, Article 225’s judicial influence is hidden behind self-
executing and less programmatic statutes. For example, when CONAMA 
passed Resolution 001 in 1986, it began the “era of environmental impact 
statements.”254 In 1996 government prosecutors filed suit against 
Volkswagen of Brazil and various state and municipal agencies because 
they failed to produce an EIS reflecting the ecological effects of con-
structing an auto factory and testing area.255 The prosecutors referred to 
Resolution 001.256 The court eventually ruled in the prosecutors’ favor.257 
Article 225 declares that the government “shall . . . require, in the man-
ner prescribed by law, for the installation of works and activities which 
may potentially cause significant degradation of the environment, a prior 
environmental impact study, which shall be made public.”258 The prepo-
sitional phrase “in the manner prescribed by law”259 bolsters Article 
225’s programmatic status. Regarding the Volkswagen suit, administra-
tive rules had already outrun Article 225’s foundational requirements by 
virtue of the CONOMA resolution. It was accordingly unnecessary for 
prosecutors to invoke the less exacting and less time-tested constitutional 
foundation for the rule. 
This interplay between self-enforcing statutes and Article 225, often 
overlapping in their legal application, exhibit both the effective pro-
grammatic character of Article 225 and its authority as a constitutional 
provision. For instance, Amazonas state prosecutors recently requested 
an injunction against the National Department of Transportation Infra-
structure program to repave a road in the Amazon. The prosecutors cited 
Article 225 as the legal mandate for an EIS rather than CONAMA’s 
Resolution 001.260 A federal judge granted the injunction.261 
                                                                                                             
 253. See supra pp. 738–44. 
 254. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 63, at 93. 
 255. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 142. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. C.F. art. 225, para. 4 (Braz.). 
 259. Id. 
 260. “‘Article No. 225 of the Constitution,’ according to state prosecutor Ricardo Braz, 
‘says that any project or work which could cause an environmental impact needs an im-
pact report and environmental license.’” Brazilian Transport Ministry to Appeal Ruling 
that Blocks Work to Repave Amazon Highway, 28 INT’L. ENVTL. REP. (BNA) No. 606 
(July 2005) [hereinafter Brazilian Transport Ministry]. 
 261. Id. But in Deliana Engenharia, Indústria e Comércio Ltda. v. Ministério Público, 
a Sao Paolo state judge denied an injunction request that would have halted the construc-
tion of apartment complexes in the Atlantic Forest (an area “elevated to the category of 
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As the above cases illustrate, Paragraph 4 (“national patrimony”) is 
very much an active262 constitutional provision in Brazilian environmen-
tal legal proceedings. In Ministério Público do Estado de São Paolo v. 
Stela Goldenstein,263 public prosecutors in São Paolo charged three offi-
cials of the State Secretariat of the Environment with violating the 1992 
Administrative Improbity Act.264 The State Secretariat had issued a per-
mit for the construction of a theme park in the Atlantic Rainforest with-
out demanding an EIS or consulting a federal environmental agency.265 
Prosecutors argued that the State Secretariat was obligated to consult a 
federal environmental agency because the building site fell under “spe-
cial federal protection status” as a consequence of Paragraph 4.266 Not 
only did the prosecutors seek an injunction, but they also sought the dis-
missal of officials and the imposition of a fine.267 The court found that 
though the permit was illegally issued, the misconduct did not breach the 
Administrative Improbity Act.268 On appeal (at the request of both par-
ties), the defendants prevailed.269 
Though the prosecutors failed to convince either the trial or appellate 
court, Stela Goldenstein demonstrates that Article 225, through specific 
provisions (in this case, Paragraph 4), added environmental teeth to tan-
gential laws. Federal officials discovered that prosecutors could utilize 
the Administrative Improbity Act to safeguard environmental interests.270 
Article 225 provided the constitutional basis for the prosecutors’ victory 
at the district level. 
                                                                                                             
‘national patrimony’ in the new constitution”). Chang, supra note 108, at 414. The judge 
reasoned that the prosecutors failed to present technical evidence that development would 
negatively impact traffic flow and sanitation, and furthermore, the assumption that there 
would be “scenic damage” to the Atlantic Forest was “highly subjective.” Id. The deci-
sion does not diminish the legal force of Article 225; rather the decision indicates that the 
judge maintained a standard of proof that he did not believe had been met by the prosecu-
tors. 
 262. Meaning “national patrimony” may play a direct role in litigation as opposed to 
its aforementioned function as a legislative foundation. 
 263. Filed July 14, 1998, in São Paulo, SP (12th Vara da Feazenda Pública) by prose-
cutor Sérgio Turra Sobrane. MCALLISTER, supra note 154, at 132. 
 264. The Administrative Improbity Act forbids state actions for purposes rendered 
illegal by law. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 133. 
 268. Id. at 132. 
 269. Id. at 133. 
 270. Id. 
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Other ostensible environmental defeats nevertheless prove that Article 
225 has resituated environmental litigation. For example, when the Bra-
zilian Institute of Consumer Defense271 and Greenpeace managed to con-
vince a district court that the National Technical Commission on Bi-
osafety (“NTCB”) had improperly approved Monsanto’s sale of genet-
ically-modified soybeans, the court had to wrestle with Article 225, Par-
agraph 1, Clause 4.272 The plaintiffs alleged that NTCB was required to 
issue an EIS and had not done so.273 The district court enjoined the 
NTCB from approving the soybeans before the issuance of an EIS.274 
The appellate court reversed.275 
The disagreement between the two courts rested on the level of discre-
tion they read into Article 225, Paragraph 1, Clause IV.276 The district 
court believed that the introduction of GMOs would automatically result 
in environmental degradation and thus, according to Clause IV, the 
NTCB had to issue an EIS before approval.277 On the other hand, the ap-
pellate court found that the NTCB retained discretion in mandating prep-
aration of an EIS.278 Thus even where the judicial decisions have not sat-
isfied environmentalists, Article 225 has redefined the constitutional bat-
tleground upon which parties contest environmental cases. 
D. Article 225’s Success: A Statement of Principle 
Despite continuous indifference, the trend towards more environmen-
tally-conscious development that started in the 1980s has been consoli-
dated, validated, and legitimized by Article 225. According to some ob-
servers, cultural values are the worst impediments to the enforcement of 
environmental laws in Brazil.279 Often the underfunding of federal and 
state environmental agencies is a byproduct of public disinterest.280 Fol-
                                                                                                             
 271. A Brazilian NGO. Id. 
 272. Lesley K. McAllister, Judging GMOs: Judicial Application of the Precautionary 
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lowing the ratification of the 1988 Constitution and its far-reaching envi-
ronmental chapter, “slowly but surely [Brazil] became aware of the seri-
ousness of its environmental problems.”281 Article 225’s effect as a na-
tional expression of an ecological ideal has been reflected in international 
environmental fora, most notably at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro.282 
The summit produced Agenda 21, a rubric for the implementation of 
sustainable development across the globe.283 In the decade following the 
adoption of the 1988 Constitution, Agenda 21 inspired the Brazilian gov-
ernment to pass 17 laws, 3 Provisional Measures, 139 Decrees, and 170 
CONAMA Resolutions.284 Considering Agenda 21’s programmatic na-
ture and the link it establishes between environmental degradation and 
“the welfare of future generations,”285 it is not difficult to imagine that 
Article 225’s similar qualities legitimized Agenda 21 in the eyes of Bra-
zilian politicians and the public. 
Article 225’s tenets also appeared in binding international treaties. The 
Earth Summit introduced the “legally-binding”286 Convention on Biolog-
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ference. Earth Summit: UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), U.N. 
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ical Diversity: Law, Institutions, and Science, 1 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (1994) (classifying 
the agreement “not as a ‘framework’ convention,” but a “specific treaty with duties and 
obligations structured within a fully-operational system”). But see W. Robert Ward, Man 
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ical Diversity (“CBD”).287 The CBD was intended to protect global bio-
diversity, promote sustainable use of biodiversity, and fairly distribute 
the benefits arising from biodiversity.288 By 2009, Brazil possessed 550 
“legal instruments related to the CBD biodiversity conservation and sus-
tainable use goals: 53 federal laws, 2 decree laws, 1 provisional measure, 
194 federal decrees, 190 rulings of [CONAMA], in addition to 75 laws 
and 35 decrees at the state level.”289 Though Brazil’s decision to sign the 
CBD cannot be solely attributed to Article 225, the constitutional thrust 
behind biodiversity protections must have validated support for the CBD 
within Brazil.290 Even critics who suggest Article 225 may encourage 
continued resource exploitation admit that Article 225 marks the first 
time Brazil declared that environmental conservation is a national val-
ue.291 
CONCLUSION 
Article 225 has played a widespread and immense role in Brazil’s bio-
diversity protections despite continuous enforcement problems. This 
Note attempts to describe the successes of Article 225, whether as a con-
stitutional foundation for environmental legislation, a recognized consti-
tutional right and policy in court, or a constitutional declaration to Brazil-
ian citizens and the world that protecting biodiversity is of paramount 
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importance. Many observers have called the environmental chapter of the 
1988 Constitution Brazil’s “most important and significant rule concern-
ing environmental issues.”292 Highlighting Article 225’s positive effects 
rather than focusing on enforcement difficulties may encourage other 
countries to consider adopting similar constitutional provisions.293 
Though this Note does not intend to underestimate Brazil’s severe en-
forcement deficiencies, the “Courage Constitution” is “undimmed” by 
the consensus that enforcement will prove to be a laborious challenge.294 
Furthermore, Article 225 has improved the very enforcement mecha-
nisms that many claim limit its effect. Article 225 provides not only 
model language but also demonstrates the practical results of adopting a 
constitutional provision guaranteeing biodiversity protection as a funda-
mental right, government policy, and national value. 
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